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Summary 
This report uses published data from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to update an 
index, first developed by Weiler (1983) in the Harvard Law Review and modified by LaLonde and 
Meltzer (1991) in the University of Chicago Law Review, of the probability that a pro-union worker will 
be fired in the course of a union election campaign. We use the more conservative LaLonde and 
Meltzer methodology and also make adjustments for the rise since the mid-1990s in "majority sign-
up" or "card check" organizing campaigns.  
Using the Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) methodology, we find that in the 2000s 
workers were illegally fired in over 1-in-4 (26 percent) of union election campaigns, up sharply from 
about 16 percent in the late 1990s. In 2007, the most recent year for which data is available, 30 
percent of union election campaigns had an illegal firing.  Pro-union workers faced about a 2.3 
percent chance of being illegally fired during the course of the campaign.  Even after we adjust for 
the effect of the rise in majority sign-up organizing campaigns, pro-union workers in 2007 appeared 
to have a 1.8 percent chance of being illegally fired.  
If we assume that employers target union organizers and activists, and that union organizers and 
activists make up about 10 percent of pro-union workers, our estimates suggest that about one-in-
five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their activities in a union 
election campaign. Even after we adjust for the increase in organizing campaigns not built around 
NLRB elections, our calculations suggest that more than one-in-seven union organizers and activists 
are illegally fired while trying to organize unions at their place of work. 
Our findings provide significant support for the view that an important part of the decline in 
private-sector unionization rates (the unionization rate in the public sector has remained constant 
for three decades) is that aggressive—even illegal—employer behavior has undermined the ability of 
workers to create unions at their work places. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) penalties 
associated with illegal firings are small: back pay for illegally fired workers minus any earnings that 
workers had after they were fired. Current law has given employers a powerful anti-union strategy: 
fire one or more prominent pro-union employees—typically workers most involved in organizing 
the union—with the hope of disrupting the internal workings of the organizing campaign, while 
intimidating the rest of the potential bargaining unit in advance of the NLRB-supervised  election.  
Introduction 
The share of U.S. workers in unions has been on the decline for the entire postwar period. In 1948, 
almost one-in-three workers (31.8 percent) was in a union; by 2008, the fraction had fallen to just 
one-in-eight (12.4 percent; see Figure 1). The drop-off in union membership has been particularly 
stark in the private sector, where, by 2008, only about one-in-thirteen workers (7.6 percent) was 
unionized, whereas more than one-in-three workers in the public sector was unionized. 
 
 
  
FIGURE 1 
Union Membership as Percent of Workforce, 1947 – 2008 
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Academics, politicians, pundits, employers, union leaders, and rank-and-file union members have 
offered a host of explanations for the drop in unionization rates. Perhaps the most common is the 
decline in the importance of manufacturing employment—where unions traditionally had their 
strongest presence. Another frequent interpretation suggests that workers no longer see unions as 
useful or relevant in the new, high-tech, overwhelmingly service-sector economy. 1 One strand of 
this particular view argues that the leadership of the labor movement has hastened the irrelevancy of 
unions by failing to adapt to long-term structural changes in the economy. A final explanation argues 
that since about 1980, employers—with substantial legal support and cover—have engaged in a 
systematic attack on unions, especially on union efforts to organize new workers.2 
This paper presents evidence that provides significant support for this last explanation of union 
decline—that aggressive, even illegal, employer behavior has undermined the ability of U.S. workers 
to create unions at their work places.  While the NLRA makes it illegal for employers to fire workers 
involved in union-organizing campaigns,3 the penalties associated with "discriminatory discharges" 
are small: back pay for illegally fired workers minus any earnings that workers had after they were 
fired.4 Given these small penalties for illegal firings, the NLRA, in practice, has given employers a 
powerful anti-union strategy: fire one or more prominent pro-union employees—typically those 
most involved in organizing the union—with the hope of disrupting the internal workings of the 
                                                 
1 That the unionization rate has basically held constant in the public sector suggests that the decline in private-sector 
representation may have more to do with behavior of private-sector employers than preferences of American 
workers. 
2 See, for example, Freeman and Medoff (1984). For an excellent history of the “union avoidance industry,” see Logan 
(2006). 
3 See Weiler (1983) for a discussion of the NLRA. 
4 See Dunlop Commission (1994), Chapter 3, p. 71. In 1990, the Dunlop Commission notes, “...the average back pay 
award amounted to $2,749 per discharge.” 
  
union’s campaign, while intimidating the rest of the potential bargaining unit in advance of the 
NLRB-supervised election.  
The NLRB publishes annual data on its determinations of "discriminatory discharges." In this 
report, we review those data and use a methodology first employed by Weiler (1983) and 
subsequently critiqued and modified by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) to estimate the probability that 
a pro-union worker is fired in connection with a union election campaign. We also use the same data 
and related methods to calculate several additional indicators of employer behavior and union 
success in union election campaigns, including the share of union-representation elections that 
include an illegal firing. 
According to the NLRB data, and following LaLonde and Meltzer's methodology, since about 2000, 
pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns have seen a substantial increase in their 
likelihood of being illegally fired. In the 1970s, a pro-union worker involved in a union election 
campaign faced about a 1-in-100 chance of being illegally fired. The probability of being fired 
reached its historical peak in the first half of the 1980s, with about 1-in-42 pro-union workers being 
illegally fired. From the second half of the 1980s through the second half of the 1990s, the 
likelihood of a being illegally fired declined steadily but remained high, reaching about 1-in-87 pro-
union workers by the end of the period. From 2000 on, however, the likelihood that a pro-union 
worker would be fired in a union-election campaign has jumped sharply—to about 1 in every 52 
pro-union workers. 
Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) have emphasized the probability that any pro-union 
worker will be fired in a union election campaign, but employers engaging in illegal firing activities 
will generally discharge key union activists, rather than random employees believed to be 
sympathetic to the union. If we assume that ten percent of pro-union workers are union activists, 
then we can estimate that in 2007 union activists faced more than a 20 percent chance of being fired 
during a union election campaign. 
The same approach used by Weiler (1983), LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), and subsequently by the 
Dunlop Commission (1994) also allows us to estimate the share of NLRB-sponsored elections 
where an illegal firing took place. According to this same methodology, in 2007, workers were 
illegally fired in about 30 percent of NLRB-sponsored elections. The average for the period 2001-
2007 was 26 percent, up sharply from about 16 percent over the period 1996-2000. Since 1951, only 
the period 1981-1985 had a higher rate of NLRB elections with an illegal firing (31 percent). 
By the mid-1990s, unions appeared to have adapted their traditional organizing strategies to reduce 
the scope for an employer’s ability to fire pro-union workers in an effort to derail union organizing 
campaigns. A key element of the new union strategy involves “majority sign-up” or “card-check” 
campaigns that seek union representation without a formal NLRB election. Even after we make 
what is probably an overly-conservative adjustment to the Weiler and LaLonde and Meltzer 
methodology so as to take this rise in majority sign-up campaigns into account, the NLRB data still 
show a substantial increase during the 2000s in illegal firings as an anti-union strategy. 
  
The Data and Methodology 
Each year, the NLRB publishes data on the progress and outcomes of a wide range of legal actions 
connected with the NLRA. The published data include detailed information on the outcomes of 
union election campaigns and investigations of "discriminatory discharges" under the NLRA.  
In the early 1980s, Harvard Law School professor Paul Weiler (1983) used three decades of the 
NLRB's published data to estimate the probability that a pro-union worker involved in a union 
organizing campaign would be the victim of a discriminatory discharge. The NLRB annual reports 
provided data that allowed Weiler to estimate both the number of workers that were illegally fired 
and the number of pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns over roughly the same 
period of time as the discriminatory discharges. Weiler's review of the data and his particular 
methodology led him to conclude that, in 1980, the “...odds are about one in twenty that a union 
supporter will be fired for exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a half-century 
ago.”5 
Economist Robert LaLonde and law professor Bernard Meltzer, both of the University of Chicago, 
however, disputed aspects of Weiler's methodology and published an extensive critique and re-
examination of the data in 1991 (LaLonde and Meltzer, 1991).6 The main thrust of their technical 
criticisms was that Weiler's methodology tended to overstate the number of workers that were 
discharged in connection with union-election campaigns (primarily because, in LaLonde and 
Meltzer's view, an important portion of fired workers were fired in contexts other than union-
election campaigns). LaLonde and Meltzer suggested and implemented several changes to Weiler's 
methodology and concluded that the probability that a pro-union worker would be fired in 
connection with a union-election campaign was between 50 and 70 percent lower than originally 
calculated by Weiler.7 In 1980, for example, according to LaLonde and Meltzer, the odds were about 
1-in-63 that a pro-union worker faced discriminatory discharge in connection with a union election, 
compared to the 1-in-20 odds calculated by Weiler from the same data.8 
In this report, we follow the more conservative methodology proposed by LaLonde and Meltzer, 
and use the last 17 years of NLRB data to update their earlier work. The basic strategy involves 
using published data from the NLRB on “remedial actions taken in unfair labor practice cases 
closed,” the “final outcome of representation elections in cases closed,” and “valid votes cast in 
representation elections in cases closed” to produce annual estimates of both the number of workers 
illegally fired and the number of pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns. Together, 
these two figures allow us to calculate the probability that a pro-union worker is illegally fired in 
                                                 
5 Weiler, 1983, p. 1781. He continues: "Such a widespread pattern of employer intimidation has ramifications that 
reach far beyond the units in which discharges actually occur. It fosters an environment in which employees will take 
very seriously even subtle warnings about the consequences of joining a union." 
6 For Weiler's response to LaLonde and Meltzer, see Weiler (1991). 
7 Compare panels A and B in LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7.  
8 LaLonde and Meltzer note: “Even the 1 in 63 ratio manifestly represents a serious denial of statutory rights to 
individual employees and a potentially serious impediment to effective union organization” (p. 992). 
  
connection with a union election campaign.9 The same approach also provides an estimate of the 
share of NLRB-sponsored elections that had an illegal firing. 
The NLRB does not report the number of workers fired illegally in connection with union election 
campaigns. The NLRB, however, does give the total number of cases closed each year in which a 
fired worker was offered reinstatement.10 Following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991, pp. 990-98), we 
assume that 51 percent of these cases each year corresponded to dismissals during union election 
campaigns.11 Also following LaLonde and Meltzer, we assume that each case involved, on average, 
2.2 workers.12 In order to estimate the number of workers illegally fired during union election 
campaigns in 2000,13 for example, we first take the number of “employees offered reinstatement” in 
that year (1,224 cases) and multiply that number by 0.51, to find the total number of reinstatement 
offers that were connected to a union election campaign (624 cases). We then multiply our estimate 
of the total number of cases with illegal firings by 2.2 employees per case to arrive at the total 
number of workers illegally fired in connection with a union election campaign: 1,373. 
Once we have an estimate of the total number of illegal firings connected to union election 
campaigns, we can easily calculate the likelihood that a pro-union worker will be illegally fired during 
a union election campaign. The NLRB annual reports provide detailed breakdowns of voting in 
union election campaigns.14 Following Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), we take the 
total number of pro-union voters (in all elections, regardless of the outcome of the election) from 
the NLRB and use this to calculate a crude probability that a pro-union worker will be fired. 
Continuing with the example of the year 2000, the NLRB data show 100,815 workers voted in favor 
of union representation in NLRB elections.15 The ratio of 1,373 illegally fired employees to 100,815 
pro-union workers in union election campaigns yields the probability that a pro-union worker is 
illegally fired during a union election campaign: 1.4 percent, which represents about one in every 73 
pro-union workers. 
Several features of the data and methodology could act to raise or lower our estimates relative to the 
true level of illegal firings connected to union election campaigns.  The first issue is that we cannot 
distinguish between campaigns that culminated in an election and campaigns that were abandoned 
                                                 
9 Following an October 20, 2006, telephone conversation with Patricia Gilbert, Associate Director of the NLRB’s 
Division of Information, we have excluded as almost certainly inaccurate the extremely high illegal firings and related 
data from 1994. 
10 We follow Weiler (1983), LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), the Dunlop Commission (1994), and others in treating cases 
where the union filed an 8(a)(3) violation with the NLRB and the worker or workers involved were subsequently 
reinstated, by third-party order or agreement of the parties, as an illegal firing. 
11 LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) found that: “... 50 percent of the [NLRB's] reinstatement orders were based on 
employer violations during organizational drives” (p. 990). In a subsequent footnote (134, p. 991), they indicate that 
the 50 percent figure was rounded from 0.51. 
12 LaLonde and Meltzer base their estimate of 2.2 workers per case on a GAO review of a sample of NLRB cases. 
According to LaLonde and Meltzer, the GAO derived the figure “...by dividing the number of employees allegedly 
discharged during organizational drives (394) by the number of complaints alleging such firings (176)” (p. 991, 
footnote 136). 
13 All NLRB data reported here refer to fiscal years of the federal government. 
14 We take the rest of the data we report, including the number of pro-union voters in union election campaigns, 
directly from the NLRB’s Tables 13 and 14. 
15 See NLRB Annual Report 2000, Table 14; of these 100,815 votes in favor of union representation, 61,466 were cast 
in “RC’ elections where the union won; 38,539 were cast in “RC” elections where the union lost; 614 in “RM” 
elections where the union won; and 373 in ‘RM” elections where the union lost. 
  
before an election was held.16 This feature of the data will have the effect of increasing the number 
of illegally-discharged workers per union election campaign since some portion of the workers were 
illegally fired during campaigns that did not result in an election.17 As LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) 
explain: “...the numerator includes discharges during all phases of an organizational campaign, 
whereas the denominator measures the number of organizational campaigns by the number of 
elections. Because not all organizing drives lead to a petition, let alone an election, the number of 
organizational campaigns is greater than the number of NLRB elections. Hence, the ... figure derived 
... may well overstate the frequency of discriminatory discharges aimed at averting unionization” (p. 
991).   
Second, following LaLonde and Meltzer, we base the illegal firings calculation on all cases closed by 
the NLRB that involved reinstatement offers, whether those offers resulted from a third-party order 
or a settlement between the parties. As Weiler, LaLonde and Meltzer, and the Dunlop Commission 
recognized, using only cases where the NLRB ordered reinstatement would severely underestimate 
the true number of illegal firings since the NLRB strongly encourages parties to settle before a 
formal third-party decision is made. Weiler, LaLonde and Meltzer, and the Dunlop Commission 
may, therefore, overestimate the true number of illegal firings because some of the settlements 
involving reinstatement might not have been classified as illegal firings if the NLRB or other third-
party made a formal ruling. At the same time, we may also understate the number of illegal firings 
because some illegally fired workers may choose not to file a formal complaint with the NLRB 
because the potential gains—eventual reinstatement and back pay (less any interim earnings)—may 
be small relative to the cost and inconvenience involved in pressing their case. LaLonde and Meltzer 
(1991) note that because of these and other “offsetting factors, estimates of the frequency of 
discharges in the organizational context are subject to error in both directions” (p. 990).18 
A third data issue is that the NLRB procedures to handle discriminatory discharge complaints take 
time, often more than a year, which means that some of the cases of illegal firings that were closed 
in a particular year may actually reflect cases concerning employer actions taken in an earlier year. 
This mismatch will likely lead our estimates of illegal firings to overstate the true number in some 
years and understate the true number in other years. To diminish the effects of these procedural lags, 
we use three-year trailing averages to summarize illegal firing activity where appropriate. 
Finally, our analysis applies only to workers covered by the NLRA. The NLRA does not cover 
public-sector workers and some workers in the private sector, most notably agricultural laborers and 
workers covered by the Railway Labor Act. As a result, our estimates exclude workers fired for 
union activity in these uncovered sectors, but also exclude pro-union workers in these sectors. 
                                                 
16 A related issue is the potential impact on our numbers of a decision by unions to plan organizing campaigns around 
“majority sign-up” or “card-check” recognition rather than an NLRB election. If unions decided to increase 
systematically the use of this organizing route, and employers resisted majority sign-up campaigns by engaging in 
illegal firings in the same way that they would have in more standard NLRB election, then our estimate of illegal 
firings per pro-union worker in an NLRB election would rise, even though the true probability of being fired was 
unchanged. Below we describe an adjustment procedure to account for majority sign-up  recognition. 
17 See LaLonde and Meltzer, p. 991. 
18 “Settlements of charges of such firings sometimes call for the employer to reinstate one or more employees. On the 
one hand, such settlements presumably involve a greater likelihood of an actual violation of  [NLRA section] 8(a)(3) 
than do cases dismissed or withdrawn. On the other hand, some charges of unlawful discrimination are presumably 
settled by employers even though no such discrimination occurred. Such settlements might be prompted by a desire 
to avoid legal expenses, reputational damage, or industrial unrest” (LaLonde and Meltzer, 1990, p. 990). 
 
  
The Rise of “Majority Sign-Up” or “Card Check” 
Organizing Strategies 
An increasing reliance on “majority sign-up” or “card-check” organizing strategies complicates both 
the calculation and interpretation of our findings. Beginning in the mid-1990s, unions began to 
adapt more aggressively and more successfully to employer “union avoidance” strategies. An 
important component of these strategic changes by unions was a shift away from the traditional 
NLRB election process toward organizing campaigns centered around “majority sign-up” 
recognition. In a traditional organizing campaign, unions collect signed cards from a majority of the 
eligible workers at an establishment asking for union representation. The union then presents these 
cards to management, which generally requests that the NLRB supervise an election with a secret 
ballot in order to verify the outcome of the union card collection. The period between the time 
when unions present management with the signed cards and the actual NLRB-supervised election is 
typically the most active period that employers engage in aggressive and illegal anti-union behavior, 
including illegal firings.  
Employers, however, also have the option to recognize the union based only on the results of union 
card collection, without having to verify the results by a secret ballot. While the decision to 
recognize the union after majority sign-up and before a formal election resides solely with 
employers, unions have developed organizing strategies around bringing pressure in some cases 
against employers to recognize the union at the time of majority sign-up, which is often the first 
time that the employer learns of the workers’ efforts to organize a union. The advantages for the 
workers are clear, including avoiding private employer meetingsthreats of plant closings, and illegal 
firings. The advantages for employers, even strongly anti-union employers, can also be significant, 
including….? This is especially true if the organizing campaign has succeeded in building a solid 
internal organizing structure and has managed to marshal significant outside support for the 
organizing campaign (for example, from community groups, religious organizations, local politicians, 
and others).19 
The increased use of majority sign-up campaigns affects our calculations, and especially the 
interpretation of our calculations, in complex ways. One interpretation of the exercise here is that we 
are attempting to create an index of underlying employer aggressiveness with respect to unions. Our 
main indicator of that unobserved condition is employers’ willingness to illegally fire workers for 
union-organizing activity. Prior to the mid-1990s, when unions pursued NLRB-election strategies 
more exclusively, the incidence of illegal firings was a reasonable and consistent proxy for underlying 
employer aggressiveness. In the mid-1990s, however, directly in response to sustained employer 
aggressiveness, unions changed strategies, in part, to explicitly reduce the likelihood that employers 
would fire pro-union activists involved in union election campaigns.  
This change in union strategy will affect both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio of 
illegally fired workers to pro-union workers. To the extent that the union strategy was successful, the 
increased use of majority sign-up campaigns after the mid-1990s will have reduced the incidence of 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of “union avoidance” strategies, see Levitt (1993), Smith (2003), and Logan (2006); for a discussion 
of threats of plant closings, see Bronfenbrenner (2000, 2001); for a discussion of the strategic response of organized 
labor from the 1990s on, see Bronfenbrenner, Friedman, Hurd, Oswald, and Seeber (1998) and Brudney (2005). 
  
illegal firings. This lowers the numerator in the ratio, reducing the apparent probability that a pro-
union worker will be fired illegally. The resulting decline in illegal firings under these circumstances 
is not the result of a decline in anti-union behavior by employers, but rather the result of an adaptive 
strategy used by unions. Without any modifications or reinterpretations, our simple indicator of 
employer aggressiveness may give misleading results after the mid-1990s swing to majority sign-up 
campaigns, by suggesting that anti-union behavior by employers is on the decline, when what is 
really happening is that unions have simply been more effective in avoiding a particular set of 
employer behaviors. 
The new union organizing strategy will also affect the denominator of the ratio. The majority sign-
up strategy has explicitly sought to avoid NLRB-supervised elections, which will have the effect of 
lowering the number of elections and therefore the number of votes cast in favor of unions. Since 
the number of votes cast in favor of unions is our proxy for the number of pro-union workers 
involved in organizing campaigns, the decline in the number of elections (relative to the total 
number of newly organized workers), all else constant, will act to increase the probability that a 
worker faces illegal firing conditional on supporting a union election campaign. 
The net impact of these two contradictory effects is not clear. The decline in the numerator (the 
observed illegal firings for any given level of union-organizing effort) would bias the index toward 
showing diminished employer opposition; the decline in the denominator (as the share of workers 
casting ballots also falls for any given level of union organizing activity) would bias the index toward 
showing greater employer opposition to union-organizing activities.  
We have several possible ways to address the issues raised by the change in the mid-1990s in union-
organizing strategies. One option is to do nothing other than to clarify the meaning of our principal 
statistics. The procedures initially proposed by Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), and 
later adopted by the Dunlop Commission (1994), continue to capture accurately the number of 
illegally fired workers per pro-union worker involved in an election-based union-organizing campaign. Unions 
are now less likely to take an organizing effort to an NLRB election, but when unions do pursue a 
more traditional election-based strategy, our statistic captures employer opposition reasonably well, 
and arguably as well as it always has. 
A second approach involves attempting to “correct” for the decline in union elections. Below we 
report adjusted numbers that effectively add the estimated pro-union portion of workers involved in 
majority sign-up campaigns back into the total pool of pro-union workers that voted in NLRB 
elections. This is not entirely satisfactory, however, because while we can fairly easily add workers 
involved in majority sign-up campaigns back into our calculations, we don't know how also to add 
back in the workers who would have been illegally fired if the union had decided to conduct an NLRB 
election rather than a majority sign-up campaign.20 We note that probably the best easily available 
estimate of these counterfactual illegal firings would be to assume that the likelihood of being fired 
in the absence of card check would be identical to the probability of being fired in the actual 
election-based campaigns that did take place. If we took this approach, however, we would end up 
effectively with the first option above—doing nothing—since proportional additions to the 
numerator and the denominator would leave the “adjusted” estimates identical to the unadjusted 
                                                 
20 Eaton and Kriesky (2001) "...find strong evidence that card-check agreements reduced management campaigning, as 
well as the use of illegal tactics such as discharges and promises of benefits, and also substantially increased the union 
recognition rate." 
  
ones. In what we report below, however, we take the most conservative approach and only adjust 
the denominator in the main ratio of interest. We add a portion of workers involved in majority 
sign-up campaigns back into our estimate of pro-union workers, but make no adjustment to the 
number of workers who were illegally fired.21 This has the unambiguous effect of lowering our 
estimate of the probability of a pro-union worker to be illegally fired relative to not making the 
adjustment. 
Trends in Illegal Firings 
In this section, we review the historical trends in illegal firings from the early 1950s through 2007 
(the most recent year for which data is available) using the NLRB data and research methodology 
described in the preceding sections. To cover the period before 1974, we rely on the published 
results from LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) and the Dunlop Commission (1994); to cover the period 
since, we rely primarily on our own analysis of the NLRB using a consistent methodology.22  
Table 1 and Figure 2 show the trends in the NLRB data over approximately five-year periods from 
1951 to the present. 23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Appendix Table 2 and related discussion for a description of how we adjust the number of pro-union workers. 
22 For the legal and institutional backdrop, see Bronfenbrenner (2000, 2001), Compa (2004), Dunlop Commission 
(1994), Freeman (2005), and Pope (2004). 
23 Our attempt to match LaLonde and Meltzer’s approach appears to have succeeded. A comparison of the first two 
panels of the table show a close match between LaLonde and Meltzer's original published results and our own 
replication of their results using the NLRB data across comparable time periods from 1974. The only differences 
between our numbers and those of LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) stem from rounding errors, which are exaggerated 
by taking the inversion of probabilities—Weiler’s (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer’s (1991) preferred method of 
reporting their results. For example, 1/0.0125 is 80; while 1/0.013 rounds to 77. 
  
TABLE 1  
Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns, 1951-2007  
  
Discriminatory 
Firings
Total Pro-
Union Voters
Pro-Union 
Voters per 
Fired Union 
Supporter
Probability  
Pro-Union 
Worker 
 Fired in 
Campaign 
(percent)
 Elections 
with Illegal 
Firing 
(percent)
 Elections 
Won by 
Unions 
(percent) 
Elections 
Held by 
NLRB
(a) LaLonde & Meltzer (1991) results  
1964-69 1,371 n.a. 209 0.5 8 59 7,698
1970-74 1,342 n.a. 196 0.5 7 54 8,298
1975-79 1,942 n.a. 110 0.9 11 49 7,884
1980-84 2,812 n.a. 57 1.8 20 46 5,049
1985-88 2,483 n.a. 36 2.8 32 48 3,559
        
(b) LaLonde & Meltzer (1991) time periods, our data    
1975-79 1,942 212,708 114 0.9 11 49 7,884
1980-84 2,812 129,082 51 2.3 27 46 5,049
1985-88 2,483 90,023 40 2.8 32 48 3,559
        
(c) Dunlop Commission (1994)      
1951-55 608 n.a. 689 0.1 5 75 n.a.
1956-60 429 n.a. 584 0.2 4 59 n.a.
1961-65 1,019 n.a. 272 0.4 8 56 n.a.
1966-70 1,346 n.a. 225 0.4 8 54 n.a.
1971-75 1,473 n.a. 171 0.6 8 43 n.a.
1976-80 2,238 n.a. 92 1.1 14 37 n.a.
1981-85 2,855 n.a. 38 2.6 32 38 n.a.
1986-90 1,967 n.a. 48 2.1 25 38 n.a.
        
(d) Our time periods, our data      
1974-80 2,099 212,478 108 1.0 12 49 7,869
1981-85 2,756 107,041 42 2.7 31 46 4,339
1986-90 1,967 94,552 54 2.1 25 49 3,580
1991-95 1,606 81,751 60 2.0 24 49 3,035
1996-00 1,092 93,365 87 1.2 16 51 3,071
2001-07 1,291 67,339 52 1.9 26 58 2,251
        
(e) Our time periods, our data, adjusted for rise in card-check    
1996-00 1,092 116,356 108 1.0 16 51 3,071
2001-07 1,291 87,541 68 1.5 26 58 2,251
Notes: Authors’ analysis of NLRB data, following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7; LaLonde and Meltzer 
(1991), Table 7; Dunlop (1994), Exhibit III-1, following LaLonde and Melter (1991), Table 7. See notes to 
Appendix Table 1. For adjustments in (e), see Appendix Table 2 and text. 
 
From the first period in the Dunlop Commission's analysis, 1951-1955, through the mid-1980s, 
(1981-1985 in the Dunlop Commission; 1985-88 in LaLonde and Meltzer), the probability that a 
pro-union worker would be fired during an organizing election increased by more than a factor of 25 
—from about a 0.1 percent chance of being fired in 1951-1955 to between 2.6 and 2.8 percent in the 
mid-1980s. LaLonde and Meltzer, the Dunlop Commission, and our extension of that analysis 
through 2007 suggest that the probability of being illegally fired peaked in the 1980s, and then fell 
  
steadily through the last half of the 1990s, to about 1.2 percent. Our analysis, however, shows that 
the current decade saw a substantial resurgence in the rate of illegal firings, averaging 1.9 percent 
over the period 2001-2007,24 or about 1-in-52 pro-union workers involved in a union election 
campaign. (Figure 2 combines consistent estimates from the Dunlop Commission, LaLonde and 
Meltzer, and our own analysis to display the average probability that a pro-union worker is fired over 
roughly five-year periods between 1951 and 2007. Figure 3 presents results from our own analysis 
of annual data—smoothed using a three-year trailing moving average—for the period 1976-2007.)25 
FIGURE 2 
Probability that a Pro-Union Worker  is Fired During a Union Election Campaign, 1951-2007 
0.2
0.4 0.4
0.6
1.1
2.7
2.1
2.0
1.0
1.5
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
1951-
55
1956-
60
1961-
65
1966-
70
1971-
75
1976-
80
1981-
85
1986-
90
1991-
95
1996-
00
2001-
07
 
Source: Dunlop Commission (1994), LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), and authors’ analysis of National Labor 
Relations Board data. See Table 1. 
Note: The probabilities for the periods 1996-00 and 2001-07 reflect downward adjustment as indicated to account 
for the rise in non-NLRB election campaigns. 
                                                 
24 For annual data, see Appendix Table 1. The rate for 2007 jumped to 2.3 percent. 
25 See Appendix Table 1 for the annual data used to produce both Table 1 and Figure 3. 
  
FIGURE 3  
Probability that a Pro-Union Worker  is Fired During a Union Election Campaign, 1976-2007 
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Source: Authors’ analysis of National Labor Relations Board data. See Appendix Table 1. 
Notes:  Percent, three-year trailing moving average; “Adjusted line” has been adjusted for rise in non-NLRB election 
campaigns. 
 
Both Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 also report our crude adjustment for the rise since the mid-1990s 
in majority sign-up organizing campaigns. Our adjustment lowers the probability that a pro-union 
worker will be fired in connection with a union-organizing campaign in the two relevant periods 
1996-2000 (from 1.2 percent to 1.0 percent) and 2001-2007 (from 1.9 percent to 1.5 percent). The 
adjustment, however, does not affect the trend over time: both the adjusted and unadjusted data 
show a sharp climb in illegal firings in the 2000s. 
Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) have emphasized the probability that a pro-union 
worker will be fired in a union election campaign. Employers, however, are unlikely to fire workers 
randomly, or simply for expressing pro-union views. Employers maximize the return to illegal firing 
by focusing on union activists. If we assume that ten percent of pro-union workers are union 
activists, and that employers target union activists, then we estimate that over the period 2001-2007, 
union activists faced about a 19 percent chance of being illegally fired during a union election 
campaign. If union activists represent 20 percent of all pro-union workers, then the probability that 
an activist is illegally fired in a union election campaign would be about 9-10 percent. If union 
activists represent only 5 percent of pro-union workers, then the probability that an activist is 
illegally fired would rise to about 38 percent. 
The LaLonde and Meltzer methodology also allows us to estimate the share of NLRB-sponsored 
elections where a worker was illegally fired for union activity. Table 1 and Figure 4 show the 
estimated share of elections with illegal firings from 1951 through 2007 from the Dunlop 
Commission, LaLonde and Meltzer, and our own analysis of the NLRB data. In the 1950s, 5 percent 
  
or fewer of NLRB elections had an illegal firing (Dunlop Commission). In the 1960s through the 
mid-1970s, the share rose to about eight percent (Dunlop Commission and LaLonde and Meltzer). 
In the second half of the 1970s, the share of elections with an illegal firing broke 10 percent before 
rising rapidly to about 30 percent in the first half of the 1980s (Dunlop Commission, LaLonde and 
Meltzer, and our own analysis). From the second half of the 1980s through the second half of the 
1990s, the share of elections with an illegal firing fell continuously to about 16 percent. Our analysis 
of the most recent NLRB data, however, show a steep rise from 2001 forward, with 26 percent of 
NLRB-sponsored elections including an illegal firing over the period 2001-2007. As Appendix Table 
1 shows, the average for 2007 was 30.4 percent, at the high end of the range seen over the 2001-
2007 period. (Figure 5 displays the annual results of our own analysis based on only the most recent 
NLRB data.26) 
Our estimates are broadly in line with survey-based evidence that does not rely on the analysis of 
NLRB data. Bronfenbrenner (1996), for example, found firings in about one-third of a national 
sample of union elections that took place between 1993 and 1995. Bronfenbrenner (2000) found 
firings in about 25 percent of a separate national sample of union election campaigns conducted in 
1998 and 1999.27 Mehta and Theodore (2005) in a survey of Chicago-area organizing campaigns 
found employers fired pro-union workers in about 30 percent of cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Each annual observation is a trailing-three-year average to smooth year-to-year differences related to the NLRB's 
reporting procedures mentioned in the methodology section. 
27 Bronfenbrenner (2000): “In addition to plant closing threats, one in every four employers in our sample discharged 
workers for union activity, while 48 percent made promises of improvement, 20 percent gave unscheduled wage 
increases, and 17 percent made unilateral changes in benefits and working conditions. Sixty-seven percent of the 
employers held supervisor one-on-ones with employees at least weekly, 11 percent promoted union activists out of 
the unit, 34 percent gave bribes or special favors to those who opposed the union, 31 percent assisted the anti-union 
committee, and 10 percent used electronic surveillance of union activists during the organizing campaign. Employers 
threatened to refer undocumented workers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 7 percent of all 
campaigns and 52 percent of cases where undocumented workers were present in the unit.” (p. 43) 
 
  
FIGURE 4 
Percent of Union Election Campaigns with an Illegal Firing, 1951-2007 
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Source: Dunlop Commission (1994), LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), and authors’ analysis of National Labor 
Relations Board data. See Table 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Percent of Union Election Campaigns with an Illegal Firing, 1976-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of National Labor Relations Board data. 
Note: Percent is a three-year trailing moving average. 
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Conclusion 
Starting at the end of the 1970s, American employers began to engage in the systematic and 
widespread use of illegal firings and other aggressive legal and illegal tactics in an attempt to 
undermine the success of campaigns for union representation. At the peak in the early 1980s, almost 
three percent of pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns were illegally fired in 
connection with those campaigns. From that peak in the early 1980s, the rate of illegal firings fell 
smoothly through the end of the 1990s, though remained high by historical standards. From about 
2000 on, however, the rate of illegal firings jumped sharply again. This observed increase in illegal 
firings holds even after we control for the rise in majority sign-up union organizing campaigns, 
which were often adopted in direct response to more aggressive anti-union tactics carried out by 
employers. 
Using the conservative methodology proposed by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), we estimate that for 
the period 2001-2007, pro-union workers involved in a union election campaign faced almost a 2 
percent chance of being fired. After applying an inherently conservative adjustment for the effects of 
majority sign-up campaigns, we estimate that pro-union workers involved in union-organizing 
campaigns that year faced a 1.5 percent chance of being fired. Since employers have a strong 
incentive to fire union organizers and activists, these figures translate to very high probabilities that 
organizers and activists will be fired in any given unionization campaign. If one-in-ten union 
supporters is an activist or an organizer, for example, our calculations suggest that in the 2000s, 
union organizers and activists face a 15 to 20 percent chance of being illegally fired. 
The same data and methodology also suggest that, over the current decade, illegal firings have  
marred over one-in-four NLRB-sponsored union elections, reaching 30 percent of elections in 2007 
(the most recent year for which data are available). 
  
  
References 
American Rights at Work. 2008. “Half a Million and Counting,” 
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/publications/general/half-a-million-and-counting-
20080917-654-116-116.html, accessed February 22, 2009. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 1996. “The Effect of Plan Closings and the Threat of Plant Closings on 
Worker Rights to Organize,” Supplement to Plant Closings and Workers Rights: A Report to the 
Council of Ministers by the Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor 
Cooperation, Dallas Texas. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 2000. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union 
Organizing. Report prepared for the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 2001. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union 
Organizing Part II: First Contract Supplement. Report prepared for the U.S. Trade Deficit Review 
Commission. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronald 
Seeber. 1998. Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Compa, Lance. 2004. Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States under 
International Human Rights Standards. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Dunlop, John T. 1994. Fact Finding Report: Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Eaton, Adrienne E. and Jill Kriesky. 2001. “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check 
Agreements,”  Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct. 2001), pp. 42-59. 
Freeman, Richard B. 2005. “What Do Unions Do? The 2004 M-brane Stringtwister Edition,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11,410. 
Freeman, Richard B. and James Medoff. 1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. 
LaLonde, Robert J. and Bernard D. Meltzer. 1991. “Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the 
Significance of Employer Illegalities,”  University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 58, pp. 953-1014.  
Levitt, Marty. 1993. Confessions of a Union Buster. New York: Random House. 
Logan, John. 2006. “The Union Avoidance Industry in the United States,” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 651-75. 
Mehta, Chirag and Nik Theodore. 2005. “Undermining the Right to Organize: Employer Behavior 
During Union Representation Campaigns, Center for Urban Economic Development,” 
University of Illinois at Chicago. 
  
Pope, James Gray. 2004. “How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales,” 
Rutgers Law School Faculty Papers No. 3. http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarkwps/fp/art3 
Smith, Robert Michael. 2003. From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and 
Unionbusting in the United States. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 
Weiler, Paul. 1983. “Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 96., no. 8 (June), pp. 1769-1827. 
Weiler, Paul. 1991. “Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars,” University of Chicago 
Law Review, vol. 58, pp. 1015-1032. 
  
Data Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 shows the annual data used to prepare Figures 3 and 5.  
Appendix Table 2 summarizes the procedure used to adjust the data on pro-union workers from 
1996 through 2007, a period that saw a substantial increase in non-NLRB-election organizing 
campaigns, in order to attempt to make the more recent data more directly comparable with the 
earlier data. 
In Table 2, the first step is to get an estimate of the total number of newly organized private-sector 
workers each year, not just those organized through NLRB elections. We found three sources for 
this figure. One is unpublished information supplied by the AFL-CIO to Brudney (2005, footnote 
45) (column one); the second are estimates for 1999 through 2003 compiled by and published in 
“Work In Progress,” an AFL-CIO newsletter (column two); and, third, results of a review by the 
American Rights at Work (2008) of organizing activities by 13 national unions (not shown in table 
since the data are not available broken down by year). All three sets of estimates include workers in 
the public sector and a few other sectors not covered by NLRB elections. In the absence of better 
estimates, we assume that the share of the total newly organized workers who were in the private 
sector, and therefore probably covered by the NLRB, was proportional to the share of private-sector 
workers in total union membership in the same year (column three). The resulting estimates of 
newly organized workers in the private sector appear in columns four (based on Brudney) and five 
(based on “Work In Progress”). We then take the total number of newly organized workers who 
were organized through NLRB elections (column six) and present this number as a share of the total 
estimated number of private-sector workers in each year. This gives us two sets of estimates 
(columns seven and eight) of the share of newly organized private-sector workers who were 
organized through NLRB elections. Since the data appear to be noisy and show no obvious trend, 
we take the average over all years of both sets of estimates and conclude that NLRB elections 
covered about 60 percent of potentially eligible private-sector workers over the period, leaving about 
40 percent organized outside of the traditional NLRB-election procedures. We assumed that about 
10 percent of workers had been organized outside these procedures in earlier years, and ended up 
with a scaling factor of 30 percent.  
We note that both the AFL-CIO data in Brudney and the “Work in Progress” data we use have 
several limitations. First, the data are compiled exclusively from successful organizing campaigns, 
and the data do not allow us to distinguish between pro- and anti-union workers participating in 
successful campaigns. The NLRB data allow us to include pro-union workers from failed elections 
as well as to exclude anti-union workers from successful elections. Since these limitations have 
contradictory effects on our calculations—the exclusion of pro-union workers in unsuccessful 
campaigns reduces our estimate of pro-union workers, while the inclusion of anti-union workers in 
successful campaigns increases our estimate of pro-union workers—the net effect of this limitation 
on our estimates is not clear. Second, the Brudney and the “Work in Progress” data do not include 
information on illegal firings, including illegal firings related to card-check campaigns (for example, 
as is common in the building trades where high worker mobility means that unions and workers 
frequently choose not to pursue violations of this type). So, our proposed adjustment to the ratio of 
illegally fired workers to union supporters adds workers to the denominator of the ratio without 
making any adjustment to the numerator. The result of this limitation is to make our correction a 
conservative estimate of the likelihood of being fired. 
  
We used the resulting scaling factor to produce our estimates of the probability of illegal firing by 
multiplying the actual number of pro-union workers in the years 1998 through 2007 by 1.3; to 
“phase in” the scaling factor, we multiplied the NLRB-reported pro-union workers by 1.1 in 1996 
and 1.2 in 1997. 
Appendix TABLE 1   
Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns, 1974-2005  
 
Pro-Union Voters per 
Fired Union Supporter  
Probability  Pro-Union 
Worker  Fired in 
Campaign (percent)
  
Discri-
minatory 
Firings
Total 
Pro-Union 
Voters Un-adjusted Adjusted   Un-adjusted Adjusted
Elections 
with Illegal 
Firing 
(percent)
 Elections 
Won by 
Unions 
(percent) 
Elections 
Held by 
NLRB
1974 1,785 223,906 125 125 0.8 0.8 9.7 51.1 8,368
1975 1,719 238,774 139 139 0.7 0.7 9.7 49.6 8,061
1976 1,520 186,706 123 123 0.8 0.8 8.6 49.7 8,027
1977 1,666 226,447 136 136 0.7 0.7 8.8 48.2 8,635
1978 1,950 181,342 93 93 1.1 1.1 11.9 48.1 7,433
1979 2,853 230,270 81 81 1.2 1.2 17.8 47.2 7,266
1980 3,199 199,900 62 62 1.6 1.6 19.9 47.9 7,296
1981 2,605 166,965 64 64 1.6 1.6 17.8 45.4 6,656
1982 2,360 103,282 44 44 2.3 2.3 25.3 43.7 4,247
1983 1,472 75,610 51 51 1.9 1.9 19.2 47.7 3,483
1984 3,971 99,651 25 25 4.0 4.0 50.7 46.5 3,561
1985 3,373 89,699 27 27 3.8 3.8 40.9 46.5 3,749
1986 1,406 92,135 66 66 1.5 1.5 17.4 47.5 3,663
1987 2,755 87,696 32 32 3.1 3.1 37.8 48.5 3,314
1988 2,398 90,561 38 38 2.6 2.6 31.1 49.5 3,509
1989 2,118 106,515 50 50 2.0 2.0 25.4 49.5 3,791
1990 1,158 95,853 83 83 1.2 1.2 14.5 49.5 3,623
1991 2,870 81,214 28 28 3.5 3.5 41.0 46.9 3,179
1992 1,197 75,959 63 63 1.6 1.6 18.2 49.8 2,993
1993 1,451 90,331 62 62 1.6 1.6 21.6 50.4 3,055
1994 -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- --
1995 905 79,500 88 88 1.1 1.1 14.1 50.4 2,911
1996 1,020 79,935 78 86 1.3 1.2 16.6 47.3 2,792
1997 1,067 91,044 85 102 1.2 1.0 15.8 50.4 3,075
1998 1,039 96,046 92 120 1.1 0.8 14.1 51.2 3,339
1999 960 98,986 103 134 1.0 0.7 13.8 53.0 3,162
2000 1,373 100,815 73 95 1.4 1.0 20.9 51.8 2,988
2001 1,409 82,403 58 76 1.7 1.3 23.6 54.2 2,714
2002 1,410 75,455 54 70 1.9 1.4 24.4 56.2 2,627
2003 1,497 74,295 50 65 2.0 1.5 27.0 56.8 2,516
2004 1,457 72,181 50 64 2.0 1.6 28.8 56.6 2,299
2005 1,169 65,551 56 73 1.8 1.4 23.4 60.5 2,267
2006 1,065 56,985 54 70 1.9 1.4 27.1 60.3 1,787
2007 1,032 44,503 43 56 2.3 1.8 30.4 59.5 1,545
Notes: Authors’ analysis of NLRB data, following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7. The number of discriminatory 
discharge  cases for 1982 are “not available this year due to technical problems” (NLRB, 1982 Annual Report, p. 268). 
The estimate here is the number of victims of discrimination offered reinstatement that year (6,332) over the average 
number of victims of discrimination per case over the period 1978-86 (approximately 3). The NLRB believes that the 
published data for 1994 contain an error (telephone conversation, October 20, 2006), and we have therefore excluded 
1994. For adjustment procedure from 1996 on, see Appendix Table 2 and text. 
  
Appendix TABLE 2       
Adjustment factor for post-1995 data for decline in relative importance of NLRB elections 
   Estimated Estimated newly    
 Newly organized share in organized workers Newly organized NLRB elections 
 workers private in private sector  Share of private sector 
  ILR WIP sector ILR WIP Total ILR WIP
         
1998 500,000 -- 0.574 287,027 -- 100,535 0.350 --
1999 600,000 474,140 0.572 342,987 271,040 112,291 0.327 0.414
2000 400,000 160,793 0.563 225,071 90,474 120,525 0.535 1.332
2001 400,000 446,039 0.560 223,975 249,754 95,408 0.426 0.382
2002 523,000 230,231 0.545 285,049 125,482 88,481 0.310 0.705
2003 400,000 140,991 0.536 214,300 75,536 87,499 0.408 1.158
         
Average      0.393 0.798
         
Addendum:        
         
Average all       0.596
Scaling factor assuming no card check prior to 1996:   0.404
Scaling factor assuming 10 percent card check prior to 1996:  0.304
Notes: Authors’ analysis. ILR refers to data from AFL-CIO cited in Brudney (2005, footnote 45) in the Iowa Law 
Review. WIP refers to data from the AFL-CIO's weekly publication “Work in Progress,” various issues. The 
estimated share of newly organized workers in the private sector assumes that the share among newly organized 
workers is proportional to the share in the existing stock of unionized workers; data from Labor Research Association 
online (www.laborresearch.org) and BLS, Union Members Summary, various years. 
 
 
 
 
